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The conventional wisdom in mainstream development policy circles is that income
transfers to the poor, and safety net policies more generally, are at best a short-term palliative
and at worst a waste of money.  They are not seen as a core element of an effective long-term
poverty reduction strategy.
What is this conventional wisdom based on?  One commonly heard view is that the poor
are roughly equally poor in the poorest countries, and there are so many of them and resources
are so limited, that these policies are a non-starter.  However, while the extent of poverty and the
resource limitations are both clear enough, the other premise is not; it is now well established
from household survey data that even in the poorest countries, the differences in levels of living
amongst the poor can be sizable.2
Another long-standing critique of this class of policies has potentially more weight.  This
says that leakage of benefits to non-target groups and adverse incentive effects on the labor
supply and savings of transfer recipients  create a serious trade off against efficiency and growth,
which is seen to be crucial to rapid poverty reduction. Even broadly  supportive assessments of
this class of policy interventions have seen their redistributive role as solely a matter of equity.3
Similarly, it is often argued that the incentive effects of public efforts to provide better insurance
can entail a cost to growth and, hence, longer-term poverty reduction.
These views are starting to be questioned at two levels.  Firstly, evidence  from careful
evaluations has pointed to a number of success stories.  Yes, there are programs that claim to be
targeted to the poor but whose benefits are captured by others,  and there are programs that
2  For example,  Smith and Subbarao (2002) give data for low-income countries indicating that the
consumption of the poorest decile is generally  30-40% lower than the next poorest.
3  For example, Barr (1992) describes the "inequality reduction" role of these policies as "almost
entirely an equity issue" (p.746).
2concentrate their benefits on poor people but have  such low coverage that they achieve little
impact overall.  However, assessments of a number of programs  have been quite positive -
debunking claims that targeted programs in poor countries awe inevitably plagued by leaka.ge and
high administrative  costs.4 Limited redistribution  appears to be possible by this means.
Secondly, the presumption of an o-verall trade-off between redistribution or insurance (on
the one hand) and growth (on the other) has come  to be questioned.  It is known that a market
economy can generate too much risk and inequality, judged solely from the viewpoint of
aggregate output.5 This theoretical possibi[ity has given a new lease of life to targeted tranlsfers
as the main instruments for publicly-provided  "social proteclion"  in poor countries, which is seen
as being good for pro-poor growth (meaning growlh that redLices poverty) by providing
insurance or helping credit-constrained poor people be productive workers or take up productive
opportunities for self-employment. 6
This paper revisits the role of targeted transfers in poor countries in the light of the new
theories on the social costs of uninsured risks and Lumitigated inequalities.  Recognizing that the
policy implications  depend crucially on whether there is good empirical evidence to support the
theoretical  arguments, the bulk of the first half of the paper discusses the evidence.  The paper
4  Compilations  of evidence on targeting performance  can be found in  Grosh (1995)  and Coady et
al., (2002). The latter paper compiles evidence  on the targeting performance of about 90 programs; for
over half, the share of program benefits going to the "poor" exceeded their population share. Of course,
the quality of the data and methods varies considerably;  the hope is that the differences average to zero.
5  A number of excellent surveys are now available of this literature,  notably Aghion et al., (1999),
Bardhan et al., (2000), Broadway and Keen (2000) and  K.anbur (2000).  Specific  papers that have fueled
this questioning of the aggregate equity-efficiency  trade-off include Dasgupta and Ray (1986), Dasgupta
(1993), Galor and Zeira (1993), Bowles and Gintis (1996), Benabou (1996,2002), McGregor  (1995),
Hoff and Lyon (1995), Hoff (1996), Aghion and Bolton (1997), Aghion et al. (1999), Piketty (1997) and
Bardhan et al. (2000).
6  Policy-oriented discussions  can be found in Holzmann and Jorgensen (1999), Bourguignon
(2000),  World Bank (2000, 2001) and Smith and  Subbarao (2002) amongst others.
3then takes up a key question for policy: Can the potential for efficient redistribution be realized
in practice using targeted transfers,  given the constraints faced in poor countries?
Revisiting the equity-efficiency  trade-off
The presumption that there is an aggregate trade off between the twin goals of economic
growth and lower inequality can be questioned for a number of reasons including the following:
*  Unless a person can initially assure that her basal metabolic rate (BMR) - the food energy
intake needed to support bodily functions at rest - is reached there can be no productive
activity of any sort.  This "threshold effect"  can mean that an economy generates massive
involuntary unemployment under one distribution of assets, while a more equitable
distribution yields full employment and high output (Dasgupta and Ray, 1986).
*> Credit market failures mean that some people  are unable to exploit growth-promoting
opportunities for investment in (physical and human) capital.  Aggregate output is the sum of
the individual outputs, each depending on own capital, in turn determined by own wealth
given the market failure.  Then aggregate output depends on the distribution of wealth (Galor
and Zeira, 1993; Benabou,  1996; Aghion and Bolton,  1997, amongst others). With declining
marginal products of capital, the output loss from the market failure will be greater for the
poor.  So the higher the proportion of poor people the lower aggregate output.
*  Distribution-dependent  growth can also be generated by the political economy, notably the
way the initial income or asset distribution influences the balance of power over public
spending (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994;  Persson and Tabellini,  1994).
*  Market failures can also create a link between spatial inequalities and growth. Geographic
externalities can entail that living in a well-endowed area means that a poor household can
eventually escape poverty, while an otherwise identical household living in a poor area sees
4stagnation or decline (Jalan and Ravallion,  2002a).  For ihis to be sustained, there must be
impediments  to factor mobility,  such that marginal products of capital and labor come to
depend causally on location.  Then policies to redress spatial inequalities can compensate for
the underlying factor market failures and so stimulate pro-poor growth.7
These arguments are fine in theory, but what does the  evidence  suggest?  Compilations
of aggregate data on growth and distribution suggest that cotutries with higher initial inequality
tend to experience  lower rates of growth cantrolling for other factors including initial income,
openness to trade and the rate of inflation.8 Indeed, if inequality is sufficiently high, countries
that would have good growth prospects  at low inequality may well realize little or no overall
growth or progress in reducing poverty.  It has been estimated that about one fifth of  the date-
country combinations in a data set for developing countries were cases in which inequality  was
so high as to stifle pro-poor growth (Ravallion,  1997b).
There are a number of concerns about the data and methods used in testing for an
aggregate equity-efficiency trade off, and the biases can go either way. There are measurement
errors in both the levels and changes in measured income ineiquality, including comparability
problems between countries and over time arising from errors in survey data (both sampling and
non-sampling errors) and heterogeneity in survey design and processing.9 There  are also
concerns about latent effects in the growth process ithlat might be correlated with initial
inequality. The latter concern can be dealt with by allowing for country-specific effects, and then
the adverse impact of inequality on growth has not been robust (Li and Zou,  1998; Barro, 2000;
7  This can be thought of as an example of a more general class of models in which memberships
influence socioeconomic  outcomes (Durlauf, 2001).
8  Papers reporting this result include Persson and Tabellini ([l994), Alesina and Rodrik (1994),
Birdsall et al., (1995), Birdsall and Londono (1997), Clarke (1995), Perotti (1996), Deininger and Squire
(1998), Deininger and Olinto (2000) and Knowles (2001).
9  For further discussion of the data problems see Bourguignon (2000) and Kanbur (2000).
5Forbes, 2000). However the signal-to-noise ratio could well be quite low in country fixed-effects
regressions of growth on inequality, in which case sizable bias can be expected  in such tests.
Another concern is that spurious inequality effects can arise from aggregation, given
credit market failures.'0 Empirical results for rural China in Ravallion (1998) indicate that
regional aggregation across the underlying micro-growth process hides the adverse effect of
inequality on growth.
The choice of control variables in identifying the relationship  is also open to question.
For example, past tests of the effect of inequality on growth have controlled for the human
capital stock, yet reducing investment in human capital is presumably one of the ways that
inequality matters to growth.
The validity of the common assumption that initial inequality has a linear effect on
aggregate growth is also questionable:  Banerijee and Duflo (1999) find evidence that changes in
income inequality are bad for growth, whichever way the changes go.  Then policies that prevent
rising inequality are good for growth, but those that reduce current inequality are not.
Given the concerns about tests using country-level data, it is promising that these theories
also have some testable implications for micro data.  The following are examples:
Farm yields (output per acre) in poor countries tend to be lower the larger the landholding;
Binswanger et al (1995)  review the evidence on this negative correlation, and discuss
alternative explanations.  To some extent the negative correlation reflects unobserved
heterogeneity in land quality. However, there is a reasonable presumption and some evidence
suggesting that the negative correlation stems from factor market failures due to asymmetric
For example, consistent aggregation across micro units can require that we use the mean of log
incomes in the aggregate growth regression. However, our data are logs of means. The difference between
the two is a measure of inequality, which can be significant purely because of  inconsistent aggregation.
6information.  Then inequality-reducing  redistributions  from large landholders to smallholders
will raise aggregate output.
*  Theoretical models based on credit-market  failures pred  ct that individual income or wealth
at one date will be an increasing concave  function of its own past value. This is testable on
micro panel data.  Using such data, Lokshin and Ravallion (2001) found nonlinearity in
household  income dynamics  for Hungary and R  ussia and Jalan and Ravallion (2001)  found
the same thing in panel data for rural C'hina. 1 Im  all three countries, the type of nonlinearity
suggests that the growth rate of mean h ouseho] d income will be lower the higher the initial
inequality. Depending on the model specification, the results for rural China imply that
inequality in current incomes lowers the mean in the following year by 4-7% at given current
mean income (Jalan and Ravallion, 2001).  (This is based on a simulation in which all
incomes are replaced by the mean; naturally this is an upper bound that is unlikely to be
attainable in practice.)  These figures are lower  than those obtained by Lokshin and Ravallion
for Russia and Hungary, where inequality  appears to be more costly to growth;  inequality
accounts for one fifth of mean current income in Hungary and about one tenth in Russia.
*  Some of the theories based on credit market failures also predict that the adverse impact of
higher inequality on growth will be transmitted  though the occupational  structure of an
economy (Banerjee  and Newman,  1993).  In testing this link, Mesnard and Ravallion (2002)
find evidence that wealth inequality attenuates thle aggregate  level of business start-ups
amongst return migrants in Tunisia.
The dynamic panel  data models in these studies were estimated by methods that allowed for the
endogeneity  of lagged income,  latent individual  effects and endogenous attrition.
7L  There is empirical support for another link between inequality and growth, via the incidence
of undernutriton.  This is likely to lower aggregate productivity.  For example, it has been
found that undernourished farm workers in poor countries tend to be less productive  (Strauss,
1986; Deolalikar,  1988).  Also, malnutrition in children is thought to have adverse long-term
consequences for their learning and hence future incomes; supportive evidence can be found
in Bhargava (1999) (for Kenya), Glewwe et al. (2001)  (for the Philippines)  and Alderman et
al. (2002) (Zimbabwe); in the latter case, the authors directly  link the poor nutritional status
of children to a drought.  Higher income  inequality is also likely to raise the incidence of
undernutrition;  Dasgupta and Ray (1986) show how this can happen in theory  and there is
supportive evidence in Ravallion (1992), using micro data for Indonesia.
'  Yet another link that has been studied empirically  is through crime. Bourguignon (2001)
discusses the theory and evidence suggesting that higher poverty and inequality can promote
crime, which is surely costly to aggregate efficiency.  Using micro data, Demombynes and
Ozler (2002) find evidence for South Africa that greater consumption inequality within and
between neighborhoods  leads to higher crime rates.
*  There is also supportive evidence  from micro data on the costs of spatial inequalities. Using a
six-year panel of farn-household  data for rural southern China in the 1980s, Jalan and
Ravallion (2002a) regress consumption growth at the household level on geographic
variables, allowing for (nonstationary)  individual effects in the growth rates.  They find that
indicators of geographic capital  had divergent impacts on consumption growth at the micro
level, controlling for household characteristics.  Living in a poor area appears to lower the
productivity of a farm-household's own investments,  which reduces the growth rate, given
restrictions  on capital mobility.  The results suggest that there are areas in rural China that are
8so poor that the consumptions of some households living in them were falling even while
otherwise identical households  living in better off areas enjoyed rising consumptions. The
geographic effects are strong enough to imply poverty traps.
*  One specific source of externalities is the local composition of economic activity.  In the
same setting in rural China, there is evidence that the composition of local economic activity
has non-negligible impacts on consumption growth at the farm-household level (Ravallion,
2002). There are significant positive effects of local economic activity in a given sector on
subsequent income growth from that sector.  Anad there are a number of significant cross-
effects, notably from farming to certain nonfarm activities.  The sector that is found to matter
most quantitatively is agriculture.
*  There is recent micro evidence pointing to the importance of other membership-based
inequalities.  For example,  van de Walle and Gunewardena (2001) argue that market failures
entail that ethnic identity influences living standards in Vietnam independently  of observable
household characteristics,  and in ways that are suggestive of a self-reinforcing mechanism
that perpetuates  ethnic inequalities.  Again, market failures appear to play a crucial role.
Before turning to the implications of all this for targeted transfers,  another strand of
recent literature needs to be brought into the picture.  This concerns the possibility that uninsured
risk can also be a negative factor to growth and poverty reduction in the longer term.
Revisiting the insurance-efficiency  trade-off
By one view, publicly provided insurance  encourages longer-term behaviors that ]promote
continuing poverty.  The classic example is a generous uneraployment  benefit system, which is
thought by some observers to discourage personal  efforts to find work.  Similarly, public
9provision of old-age pensions is thought to discourage savings.  These are examples of how
rmoral hazard generates  an insurance-efficiency  trade-off.
Are there also reasons to question the insurance-efficiency  trade-off in poor countries?  If
there were such an aggregate trade off then one would expect poor people to be relatively well
insured. That is plainly not the case. From what we know, it is difficult to argue that poor people
in the world are typically over-insured from the point of view of making them less poor.  There
is now a body of empirical work demonstrating  a high exposure to uninsured risk, notably in
rural areas.12 It is widely thought that the poor are more vulnerable to uninsured risk, and there
is supportive  evidence in the results of Jalan and Ravallion (1999) on the sensitivity of
consumption to income  shocks in rural China.  There may well be scope for public efforts to
better provide insurance to the poor, and targeted transfers are a likely instrument.  However,
will this come at a longer-term cost to poor people?
Recent literature has also pointed to various ways that uninsured risk can actually be a
cause of chronic poverty.  One argument postulates threshold effects in consumption giving rise
to a "dynamic poverty trap."  To outline a simple case, consider a worker who cannot borrow or
save and derives income solely from labor.  The worker's productivity depends on past
consumption, and only if consumption  is above some critical level is it possible to be productive
and hence earn any income.  Beyond this threshold, diminishing returns set it, meaning that extra
current consumption raises future productivity  but at a declining rate as consumption rises.
In this type of model, permanent destitution can stem from transient shocks and people
can escape even extreme poverty with only temporary income support.  These features arise from
the possibility of multiple solutions for the income or wealth of a given family.  There can be a
12  Overviews of the theory and evidence  can be found in Deaton (1992) and Besley (1995).
10high-income solution and a low income one, both of which are dynamically  stable, in that
income will return to its initial value after a shock.  Between  these, one can expect to find an
unstable third solution, below which incomes tend to fall toward the low-income solution, while
above which they rise to the high-income solution. Thus, a household at the high-income
solution who suffers a sufficiently large negative shock will see its income decline until it
reaches the lowest income. And a household at the low-inco me solution will be able to escape
poverty after even a transient income gain - but only if  thal  gain is large enough to get past the
unstable solution.  This is an example of a "'dynamic poverty trap."  It implies that there will be
large long-term benefits from institutions and policies that protect people from transient shocks,
or provide temporary support for the poorest.  Likewise,  the absence of an effective safety  net
emerges as a cause of long-term poverty.
Are such arguments plausible?  The very existence  o f a positive BMR means that a
consumption threshold must exist, which is one requirement  for the dynamic poverty trap
described above whereby uninsured risk can create  longer-term  poverty.  Unless a person can
initially assure that BMR is reached there can be no productive  activity of any sort.  A threshold
effect can also stem from the fact that in almost all societies one must be housed and adequately
clothed if one is to participate in most social activity, including work.  Low consumption creates
social exclusion.  For example,  advocates  cf a proposed (untargeted) transfer program in South
Africa claimed that the grant would be productive, by allowing people to travel to find work and
to buy clothes to wear to job interviews (Wagshington Post Foreign  Service, July 9, 2002).
However, the case for intervention rests on believing that the threshold effect exists in the
absence of intervention. That is less clear. 1There  will be a high return to private co-insurance
when there is a threshold effect. One can readily grant that (rnarket or quasi-market)  credit and
11risk-sharing arrangements  do not work perfectly, given the usual problems of asymmetric
information.  Yet they may still work well enough to make dynamic poverty traps a rarity.
The panel-data studies by Lokshin and Ravallion (2001)  and Jalan and Ravallion (2001 a)
discussed above also tested for the existence of dynamic poverty traps.  Household income or
consumption was allowed to be a nonlinear function of its own lagged value with corrections for
latent heterogeneity and measurement errors.  On calibrating the model to a six-year household-
level panel data (in which the same households are tracked over time) for rural southwest China,
Jalan and Ravallion (2001 a) did not find evidence of threshold effects in the dynamics (though
they do find nonlinearity,  as discussed above).13 The same is true of Lokshin and Ravallion
(12001), using data for Russia and Hungary.  The results for all three countries suggest that people
tend to bounce back from transient shocks.  However,  all three studies found that the speed of
income adjustment to a shock is lower for the long-term poor (those with low steady-state
income).1 4 This can generate a process of income dynamics that might look like a poverty trap
but is not.
If one takes it as given that without a (formal  or informal)  safety net there will be a low-
level threshold effect on productivity, then these results suggest the existence of a roughly
binding consumption floor achieved by existing (public and private) safety nets.  Of course, that
can still leave considerable uninsured risk, which is found to be the case in the same settings.Is
13  Possibly the threshold  effect takes longer than six years, though  it is difficult to see why a sign of
the productivity cost of low initial consumption would not be apparent over this time period.
14  The steeper the recursion  diagram the slower the speed of adjustment to a shock.  Concavity of
the recursion diagram implies that the speed of adjustment for a given household will be lower when it
receives a negative shock than a positive shock. However,  here we are concerned  with differences in the
speed of adjustment between households  at different steady-state incomes. In all three countries, the speed
of adjustment (evaluated  in a neighborhood of the steady-state solution) was found to be lower for
households with lower steady-state  incomes.
See Jalan and Ravallion  (1998a)  for China and Lokshin and Ravallion (2000) for Russia.
12And the dynamics might be quite different for higliLy covariat:e  risk, since the informal safety net
arrangements may then break down,  leaving the threshold exposed.
Uninsured risk can also perpetuate poverty via production and portfolio  choices. A
number of empirical  studies have found costly behavioral responses to income risk in poor rural
economies. 16 Outmoded agricultural technologies  can persist because they are less risky (see, for
example, Morduch,  1995). Risk can induce poor credit-constrained  households  to hold high
levels of relatively unproductive liquid wealth.  If borrowing  is not an option when there is a
sudden drop in income, then liquid wealth will be needed to protect consumption.  For exarnple,
Indian fartners have been found to hold livestock as a precaution against risk even though m-ore
productive investment opportunities were available (Rosenzweig and Wolpin,  1993).
Whether it is the poor who incur the largest costs of uninsured risk is not as obvious as is
often claimed by casual observers.  Jalan and Ravallion (20011b)  tested for portfolio  and other
behavioral responses to idiosyncratic risk in the same rural areas of southwest China.  They
confirmed other findings that wealth is held in unproductive liquid forns to protect against
idiosyncratic income risk. However, consistently with expectations from their theoretical model,
they found that neither the poorest quintile nor the richest appear to hold liquid wealth because of
income risk; it is the middle-income  groups that do so.  It appears that the rich in this setting do
not need to hold precautionary liquid wealth,  and the poor cannot afford to do so.
Other potentially  costly responses to risk identified in the literature include adverse
effects on human capital.  Jacoby and Skoufias  (1997) find seasonal  effects on schooling of
income risk in semi-arid  areas of India.  But here too the evidence is mixed.  Jalan and Ravallion
(2001 b) find that schooling and (hence)  future incomes in their data for rural China are quite well
16  Exaxnples  include Paxson (1992), Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993), Rosenzweig  and Wolpin
(1993), Alderman (1996), Dercon (1998)  and Fafchamps, Udry and Czukas (1998).
13protected from the income and health risks faced by the household.  Schady (2002) finds that
schooling increased during Peru's macroeconomic  crisis 1988-92, which he attributes to lower
foregone income from attending school during the crisis.
Some of the evidence suggests large long-term costs to the poor from uninsured risk, but
some does not.  Of course, there are still welfare costs of uninsured risks facing poor people; the
classic risk-aversion case for insurance remains even if risk is not a cause of chronic poverty.
Efficient redistribution through targeted transfers
Market imperfections point to a potential for efficient redistributions, which help alleviate
the constraints arising from those market imperfections.  This has a number of implications  for
policy.  For example,  it suggests that the common focus on the direct static incidence of transfers
- how much goes to the poor versus nonpoor, for example - may miss important dynamic
benefits from such policies,  as argued by Holzmann (1990).  It also holds implications  for the
design of targeted transfers, which this section will consider further.
Of course, finding that inequality  and uninsured risk are more likely to be harmful to
growth than growth promoting does not in itself imply that any policy to reduce inequality or risk
vwill enhance growth and reduce poverty in the longer term.  Indeed, the opposite can happen if
the policy intervention comes at the expense of other factors that are also known to matter to
growth. Reducing inequality by adding further distortions  to external trade or the domestic
economy will have ambiguous effects. By the same token, the best role for policy may not be to
reduce current inequality,  but rather to attenuate its adverse impacts,  such as by alleviating the
market failures that make inequality matter to aggregate welfare outcomes over time.
14These observations warn for caution in drawing lessons for redistributive policy from the
existing theory and evidence on the efficiency  costs of inequality.  However,  as this section will
argue, this new literature does hold some insights for policy.
The following discussion will not t-y to identify  the best programs in the abstract, which
is probably futile; recent evidence on the heterogeneity  in th,  performance  of the same program
across different settings,  and the lack of heterogeneity  in the performance  of different programs
in the same setting, points to the importance of context and the weak power of generalizations
about what works and what does not. 1 7 However, there is more scope for generalizations  about
principles for guiding the design of effective interventions in specific settings.
Objectives and constraints: Poverty reduction is typically seen to be the objective of
targeted transfers in poor countries.  "Poverty" is typically defined as the inability to afford
specific consumption needs in a given society. There is a large literature on how this can be
measured  (for an overview  see Ravallion,  1994).  Here I shell only note some key issues that
arise in the context of discussing targeted transfers.
Firstly, aggregate poverty is taken to be a population-weighted  aggregate of individual
poverty levels.  Group memberships  may still be causally relevant to poverty and figure
prominently in targeted policies (as discussed below),  but only in so far as those groups have
high concentrations of individual poverty  or group memberships  influence other constrainits on
policy-making, such as political economy constraints (whereby certain groups have
disproportionate  influence).  Such "individualism"  in defining the welfare objectives of policy is
standard practice though it can be questioned;  see for example Kanbur (2000).
17  For an example of the heterogeneity  in perfonnance  of the same program see Galasso  and
Ravallion (2002);  for an example  of how similar progiram perfon-nance  can be in the same setting see
Pritchett et al (2002).Secondly, while targeting is a potential instrument for enhancing program impact on
poverty, the most targeted program need not be the one with the greatest impact on poverty (van
de Walle,  1998).  This can happen when finer targeting undermines  political support for the
required taxation (Besley and Kanbur,  1993;  Gelbach and Pritchett,  1997;  De Donder and
Hindriks,  1998), or when targeting generates  deadweight losses (Ravallion and Datt,  1995)
Thirdly, while one might agree that poverty reduction is the objective, there is still an
issue of how impact on poverty today should be weighed against poverty in the future.  Theories
of efficient redistribution point to the importance of reaching those who are locked out of credit
and insurance, leading to under investment in physical and human capital  and hence higher
future poverty.  Theory and policy have often assumed that this is the same set of people as the
currently "poor" by some agreed  definition, but that cannot be presumed to hold in reality.  For
example, while household poverty is correlated with children's  school attendance,  there are non-
negligible numbers of poor children at school, and plenty  of kids from noon-poor  families not at
school.  8  The currently poor need not be the same set of people as those excludcd from credit
and insurance,  and so vulnerable to future poverty.
Finally, it should not be forgotten that the scope for efficient redistribution  and insurance
is constrained by the information  available and administrative  capabilities for acting  on that
.nformation.  Problems of information and incentives  are at the heart of policy design.!
[nformational  constraints  are particularly relevant in underdeveloped  economies.  In rural sectors
and the urban informnal  sector, policies such as a progressive income tax are seldom feasible
See, for example, the evidence for Mexico  in Sadoulet and de Janvry (2002).
] 9  Overviews of the arguments and evidence can be found  in Besley and Kanbur (I 993), Lipton and
Ravallion  (1995, section 6), van de Walle  (1998), Kanbur (2000)  and Coady et al., (2002).
16(though of course such policies are themselves  second-best responses to information constrainlts
even in rich countries). Means tests pose similar problems.
The following discussion will focus on how the main types of policies found in practice
deal with these constraints.
Indicator  targeting: The problems of observing incomes and the incentive effects of
means testing have led to various schemes that make transfers according to covariates of poverty,
such as living in a poor area, age (both children and the elderly),  and landlessness in rural areas.
Tools exist for finding optimal allocations  to minimize a poverty index based on such poverty
proxies and for measuring the maximum impact on poverty (Ravallion,  1993).
Policy makers seem often to have over-optimistic  views on how well they can reach the
poor by administrative targeting based on readily observable indicators.  Here there are some
sobering lessons from empirical research.  Even using a comprehensive,  high-quality, survey one
can rarely explain more than half the variance in consuimption or income across households.  And
while household consumption is probably not a random walk, i t is difficult to explain more than
one tenth of the variance in future changes in consumption using current information in a panlel
survey.20 Add to this the fact that one must base targeting on observations for the whole
population - not just a sample survey - and that there will be  incentives to distort the data
when it is known why it is being collected, one must expect potentially large errors in practice
when using indicator targeting to fight chronic or (especially) transient poverty.
But it can also be argued that the benefits of indicator targeting are often underestimated.
Past work has typically viewed indicator targeting as a static non-behavioral  problem; for
example, location is simply one of the proxies used to indicate poverty. The possibility of
20  For a direct test of the random walk property  (as implied by the permanent income hypothesis
under certain conditions)  see Bhargava and Ravallion (1993),  using panel data from rural India.
17poverty traps arising from market failures offers a different perspective,  pointing to the potential
for dynamic efficiency gains.  Targeting poor areas or minority ethnic groups - that would
otherwise be locked out of economic opportunities - may well have considerably greater impact
than suggested by the role of these characteristics  as a purely statistical indicator of poverty
would suggest.
The evidence to support that claim is still scant and often inconclusive.  Some observers
have pointed to evidence that a share of the transfers received by the poor is often saved or
invested as indicating that the transfers reduce chronic poverty.  However, this could just as
well reflect recipients'  perceptions that the transfers are transient; there can be saving from a
short-term transfer even when it has no impact on long-term income.
Longitudinal  ("panel") data can offer more convincing evidence, but such studies are still
scarce.  In one example, household panel data collected over six years was used to study the
consumption  impacts of China's massive anti-poverty program targeted to poor areas. It was
found that the program raised long-term consumption growth rates, implying quite reasonable
rates of return over time (Jalan and Ravallion,  1998). In another example,  Garces et al. (2002)
studied panel data spanning 27 years for the U.S. and found longer-term  gains in schooling and
earnings from a pre-school program targeted to poor families in the U.S.
Productivity effects have been emphasized  in schemes that redistribute between
landholding classes.  Landless households in rural areas tend to have a high incidence of poverty
(in South Asia particularly).  Ravallion and Sen (1994) study the effects of redistribution using
transfers  between landholding classes in rural Bangladesh, allowing for the higher productivity
(output per acre) of smaller holdings. They find that these effects do increase the poverty-
21  See, for example, Devereux (2002) using data for transfer programs in Mozambique, Namibia
and Zambia.
18reducing  impact of land-based targeting, though the extra impact is not large, given that land
holding is not by any means a perfect poverty indicator, even  in rural Bangladesh.
Specific demograplic groups (both children and the elderly) have also been targeted, and
here too there can be efficiency benefits.22 F`or example,  South Africa has a pension scheme that
gives cash transfers to the elderly; Duflo (2000) findLs positive external benefits to child health
within recipient  farnilies.
Finding that transfers based on indicators of current pcverty can bring long-term benefits,
given factor market imperfections, does not mean t:hat they are the best policy option for this
purpose.  Policies to increase  factor mobility can also, have  a role.  Incentives to attract  private
capital into poorly endowed areas,  and/or encourage  labor migration out of them, could well be
more poverty reducing than targeted transfers.  There has been very little work on these policy
choices, and one  often hears overstated clainis by advocates.  F'or example,  it is far from clear that
that out-migration policies from poor areas are highly substitutable with transfers  to those areas,
which can be crucial to fostering out migration, such as by prcmoting better schooling or making
livelihoods  less vulnerable ).o temporary  labcr shortages.
Conditional  transfers:  In the  1  990s, a number of new Lransfer programs emerged that
combine indicator targeting,  often using community groups,  Aith explicit attempts to enhance
capital  accurnulation of the poor.23 One  class of these progranms  combines transfers with
schooling  (and sometimes health-care)  requirements.2 4 An example is Bangladesh's  Food-for-
22  Here too measurement problems  loom large. Allowing for scale  economies in consumption  can
readily reverse the common finding that larger households tend to be poorer based on consumption or
income per person  (Lanjouw and Ravallion,  1995).
23  McGregor (1995)  provides an  interesting, theoretical  analysis of the policy choice between a pure
transfer policy versus schooling plus transfers,  suggestinrg that the latter option  is likely to dominate.
24  The term "conditional  transfers"  is widely used  in recent policy-oriented  discussions to refer
exclusively to  such programs.  However,  this is rather odd usage,  given that it would seem that all
transfer programs  in practice have eligibility conditions of some  sor:.
19Education (FFE) Program, which relies on community-based targeting of food transfers that aim
to create an incentive for reducing the cost to the poor of market failures.  FFE was one of the
earliest of many school-enrollment  subsidy programs now found in both developing and
developed countries.  Other examples  are Progresa in Mexico and Bolsa Escola in Brazil;  in
these programs,  cash transfers are targeted to certain demographic  groups in poor areas
conditional  on regular school attendance and visits to health centers.
If one was concerned solely with current income gains to participants then one would
clearly not want to use school attendance requirements, which impose a cost on poor families by
inducing them to withdraw children or teenagers from the labor force, thus reducing the (net)
income gain to the poor.  This type of program is clearly aiming to balance a current poverty
reduction objective against an objective  of reducing future poverty.  Given the credit market
failure, the incentive effect on labor supply of the program (often seen as an adverse outcome of
transfers)  is now judged to be a benefit - to the extent that a well-targeted  transfer allows poor
families to keep the kids in school, rather than sending them to work.
There is evidence of significant gains from Bangladesh's  FFE program in terms of school
attendance  with only modest forgone income through displaced  child labor (Ravallion and
Wodon, 2000).  The program was able to appreciably increase  schooling, at modest cost to the
current incomes of poor families. Mexico's Progresa program has also been found to increase
schooling, though the gains appear to be lower than for FFE (Behrman et al., 2001; Schultz,
2001).  This is probably because primary schooling rates are higher in Mexico,  implying less
value-added  over the (counter-factual)  schooling levels that would obtain otherwise.  Sadoulet
and de Janvry (2002) show that there would be greater efficiency gains (though higher
20schooling) from Progresa if the program had concentrated on children less likely to attend school
in the absence of the program, notably by focusing  on the transition to secondary  school.
Relying on administrative targeting based on poverty indicators naturally constrains
performance.  Even the best indicators available are far from perfect predictors of poverty at one
date, and are typically far worse at predicting changes in welfire ex ante. Administrative
inflexibility further constrains the scope for effective insurance by these means.  Next we will
consider some ways developing country governmenrts  have used to try to improve performance at
reaching the poor within prevailing informational constraints.
Community-based  programs: In recent times, commtnity participation in program
design and implementation has been a popular means of relieving the informational constraint.
The central government delegates  authority  to presumably better-informed  community
(governmental  or non-governmental) organizations,  while the center retains  control over how
much goes to each locality.  The main concern has been capture by local elites;  the informational
advantage of community-based targeting may well be outweighed by an accountability
disadvantage.  Good evidence  on performance is still scant.25 Reliable  generalizations  are also
likely to be illusive given that there are good reasons to expect heterogeneity  across communities
in the impacts of the sarne program.  Relevant sources of heterogeneity identified in the
theoretical literature include local asset inequality (Elhardan and Mookerjee,  2000; Benabou,
2000) and the extent of interlinkage in local social networks (Spagnolo,  1999).
In the design of Bangladesh's FFE program,  economically  backward areas were supposed
to be chosen by the center leaving community groups-exploiting idiosyncratic local
information- to select participants within Ihose areas. Galasso and Ravallion (2002) use survey
25  For an excellent survey of the arguments and evidence on community-based targeting see
Conning and Kevane  (1999).
21data to assess FFE incidence  within and between villages.  Targeting performance was measured
by the difference between the realized per capita allocation to the poor and the non-poor.  The
study found that targeting performance varied greatly between villages. Higher allocations from
the center to a village tended to yield better targeting performance,  but there was no sign that
poorer villages were any better or worse at targeting their poor.26
The results also suggest that inequality within villages matters to the relative power of the
poor in local decision-making.  Galasso and Ravallion found that more unequal villages in termns
of the distribution of land are worse at targeting the poor - consistent with the view that greater
land inequality comes with lower power for the poor in village decision making.  This suggests a
mechanism whereby inequality is perpetuated through the local political economy; the more
unequal the initial distribution of assets, the better positioned the nonpoor will be to capture the
benefits of external efforts to help the poor.
Self-targeting: The informational constraints on redistributive policies in poor countries
have strengthened arguments for using self-targeting mechanisms.  The classic case is workfare,
in which work requirements are imposed on welfare recipients with the aim of creating
incentives to encourage participation only by the poor and reduce  dependency on the program.27
An example is the famous Employment  Guarantee Scheme (EGS) in Maharashtra,  India.
This aims to assure income support in rural areas by providing unskilled manual labor at low
wages to anyone who wants it.  The scheme is financed domestically, largely from taxes on the
relatively well-off segments of Maharashtra's urban populations.  The employment guarantee  is
a novel feature of the EGS, which helps support the insurance function, and also helps empower
26  On the theoretical arguments  linking targeting performance to poverty see Ravallion (1999a).
27  Besley and Coate (1992) provide a formnal model of the incentive arguments.
22poor people.  In practice, however,  most workf are schemes have entailed some rationing of the
available work, often in combination with geographic targeting.
Workfare schemes generally have a good record in screening the poor from non-poor,
and providing effective insurance  against both covariate and idiosyncratic  shocks.28 They have
provided protection when there is a threat of famine (lDreze and Sen,  1989; Ravallion,  1997) or
in the wake of a macroeconomic crisis (Jalan and Ravallion, 2002b, for Argentina and Pritchett
et al., 2002, for Indonesia, both in the late  1990s).  Design featurzs are crucial, notably that the
wage rate is not set too high. For example,  Ravallion et: al.,  (1993) provide  evidence on how the
EGS responds to aggregate  shocks, and on how its ability to insure the poor was jeopardized by a
sharp increase in the wage rate.
There are other ways to use incentives in program design to assure self-targeting of the
poor.  For example,  the rationing of food or health subsidies by queuing can also be self-
targeting (Alderman,  1987), as can subsidizing inferior food staples or packaging in ways that
are unappealing  to the nonpoor.
Self-targeted  schemes can face a sharp irade-off between targeting performance (meaning
their ability to concentrate benefits  on the poor) and net income gains to participants,  given that
these programs work by deliberately imposing costs on, participants.  Self-targeting requires that
the cost of participation  is higher for the non-poor than the poor l'so that it is the poor who tencl to
participate),  but it may not be inconsequential  to the poor.
A potentially  important cost to workfare participants in developing countries is forgone
income.  This is unlikely to be zero; the poor caLn rarely afford to be idle.  An estimate for two
villages in Maharashtra, India found that the forgone income from  employment  on public works
28  See, for example,  Ravallion and Daft (1995),  Subbarao (1997). Teklu et al.,  (1999), Jalan and
Ravallion (2000), Chirwa et al., (2002).
23schemes was quite low - around one quarter of gross wage earnings; most of the time displaced
was in domestic labor, leisure and unemployment (Datt and Ravallion,  1994). By contrast, for a
workfare program in Argentina - the Trabajar Program - it was estimated that about one half
of gross wage earmings was taken up by forgone incomes (Jalan and Ravallion, 2002b).  In the
Trabajar Program, the income lost to participating workers was probably compensated by
indirect gains to the poor as residents of the neighborhoods in which the work was done,
typically involving the creation and maintenance  of valued local infrastructure.  Calculation of
the cost-effectiveness of this program suggest that it still only costs about $1.00 to $1.50 to
transfer $1.00 to the poor even taking account of the deadweight loss due to costs of
participation.29 However, workfare programs have traditionally under-emphasized  the potential
value to the poor of the assets created, which appear often to mainly benefit the non-poor or be
of little value to anyone (see, for example, Gaiha,  1996, writing about Maharashtra's EGS.)
The Trabajar program illustrates the potential for a new wave of workfare programs that
emphasize asset creation in poor communities,  again compensating  for the market  failures that
help create poor areas in the first place.  There is typically much useful work to do in poor
neighborhoods - work that would probably not get financed otherwise.
In macroeconomic  or agro-climatic crises,  it is to be expected that the emphasis will shift
to current income gains, away from asset creation - implying,  for example, more labor-
intensive sub-projects on workfare  programs (for further discussion see Ravallion,  1999b).
However, the appropriate trade-off between the objective of raising current incomes of the poor
versus reducing future poverty will never be a straightforward  choice.
29  These are the author's calculations using the  methods outlined in Ravallion (1999b).
24Sustainability andpolitical economy:  While theory points to efficiency gains from
permanent redistribution,  the implications of short-term redistributions  are less clear. The
insurance gains from targeted transfers also  depend on the sustainability of programs across
different states of nature, including coverage across groups facing different risks.  In these
respects the record is mixed.  Some programs like the EGS have been sustained over long
periods, and appear to have provided effective insurance.  This can help assure sustainability,
since (given that there is idiosyncratic risk) the potential set of beneficiaries is much larger than
the actual set at any one date. It clearly also helps if the non-poor see benefits from effectivre
social protection, such as in attenuating migration to cities in times of stress in rural areas.
However,  other designs for targeted transfer schemes have been more short-lived.  Sustainability
depends on having broad political support,  which can be at odds with fine targeting.  So there
may well be a trade-off between  sustainability and the extent of redistribution by this means.
Political economy  clearly looms large in this area of policy making.  The fact that
inequality is inefficiently high need not mean that thiere will be an effective political responase to
lower it.  Benabou (2000) has demonstrated theoretically thai: an economy with persistently high
inequality, and little effort to reduce  it, can coexist with one that is otherwise identical in
fundamentals but in which active redistribution keeps inequality low.  External agents, including
the International Financial  Institutions, may  well have an important role in using their allocative
choices and dialogues on country policy to promote efficient redistributive policies, particularly
in high inequality countries, where adoption  appears  less likely.  Similarly, there is a role for the
central government in promoting  efficient redistribuition  in high-inequality  communities.
25Conclusions
Transfers to the poor have often been motivated by inequality or risk aversion.  A trade-
off with aggregate output is expected.  A body of recent theoretical  and empirical work has
questioned whether there is such a trade-off.  This new research has argued that there can be too
much uninsured risk and inequality, when judged solely from the viewpoint of aggregate output.
For example,  credit market failures can mean that it is the poor who  are unable to exploit new
economic opportunities; the more poor people, the fewer the opportunities that get exploited and
so the lower the rate of growth.  Concentrations of poverty in poor (natural and man-made)
environments can also be sustained by factor-market failures given geographic externalities.
This body of theory and evidence offers a new perspective  on social protection policies  in
poor countries, suggesting that there is scope for using these policies to compensate for the
market failures that help perpetuate poverty, particularly in high-inequality  settings.  There have
been a number of seemingly successful transfer schemes that reflect such an emphasis.
However, in drawing implications  for future policy there are a number of caveats.  Not all the
evidence has been supportive of the theories,  or suggestive of large potential gains, even when
the theory is supported qualitatively by the data.  It is also difficult to pre-judge the best policy
instruments for achieving  efficient redistribution.  For some purposes of anti-poverty  policy -
"helping those who cannot help themselves" - there is no obvious alternative to targeted
transfers, barring unacceptable neglect.  But, more generally, it is not clear that targeted transfers
dominate other options.  These may include direct efforts to make factor markets work better for
the poor (such as by fostering new institutions for credit provision, or by better enforcement  of
property rights), supply-side  interventions in schooling and health-care, or even untargeted
transfers.  And the way transfers are financed in practice will clearly matter.  In theory there can
26be potential Pareto improvements from transfers financed oul of the subsequent income  gaiLns to
poor recipients;  but finding a feasible means of such cost recovery is another matter.
While acknowledging these caveats, this tour of the nzw arguments and evidence on
efficient redistribution and insurance points to a confident rejection of the generally negative
stereotype of this class of interventions that has been around  in mainstream  development policy
discussions for some time.  The trade-off against efficiency has probably been exaggerated,  and
the record on performance  is better than sorne (seerningly widely held) perceptions would
suggest.  It is time for a pragmatic and open-minded  approach to this class of interventions,
recognizing the potentially important role they can play, but using careful design and evaluiation
to assure that the potential is realized.
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